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Why Do They Keep Coming?
Labor Migrants in the Persian Gulf States
Andrew M. Gardner  *

By some estimates, labor migration to the Persian Gulf states comprises the
third largest migration flow in the contemporary world. In comparison with
the scholarly literature concerning the larger migration flows to North America and Europe, our collective understanding of migration to the Gulf states
remains in its infancy. Nonetheless, within the tidy scholarly literature concerning this transnational flow of labor one can discern a small constellation
of nascent themes. One theme that threads through several decades of scholarly analysis concerns the problematic and exploitative labor relations that
* Grateful acknowledgment goes to the Center for International and Regional Studies,
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, for providing research
funding for this project. I am grateful to all the members of the Center for International and Regional Studies Migrant Labor Working Group for the comments and
questions that greatly improved this chapter, and to the migrant laborers in Qatar
who so willingly shared their perspectives and experiences with me. Special thanks
also go to the cohort of research assistants I employed for this project, including
Deependra Giri, Yogamaya Mantha, Tara Thompson, Ramesh Pandey, and Nive Das.
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seemingly characterize the experiences of many of the poorest transnational
labor migrants who spend time in Gulf States.1
The starting point and unexamined premise of this chapter, then, is that
unskilled or low-income labor migrants typically face significant challenges
and problems during their sojourn in the Gulf states. This premise remains an
ethnographic assertion—one backed by a substantial ethnographic literature,
an abundance of anecdotal support, and occasional contributions derived
from small or localized surveys of particular migrant labor populations in the
region.2 Although the parameters of these challenges and difficulties are well
documented elsewhere, a brief review will be useful to the reader. To summarize, the analytic focus of these works is typically centered on the coupling of
the transnational labor brokerage system with the kafala or sponsorship system, by which foreign migration is managed and governed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. In this system, many migrants receive less pay
than they were contractually promised; many migrants work longer hours
than their contracts originally indicated; non-payment of promised wages
 E.J.A.M. Spaan, “Socio-Economic Conditions of Sri Lankan Migrant Workers in the
Gulf States,” in F. Eelens, T. Schampers and J.D. Speckmann (eds), Labour Migration
to the Middle East: From Sri Lanka to the Gulf (London: Kegan Paul International,
1992); Anh Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Anh Longva, “Keeping Migrant Workers In
Check: The Kafala System in the Gulf,” Middle East Report 211 (1999): pp. 20–22;
Michele Gamburd, The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s
Migrant Housemaids (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Anisur Rahman,
Indian Labour Migration to the Gulf: A Socio-Economic Analysis (New Delhi: Rajat
Publications, 2001); Staci Strobl, “Policing Housemaids: The Criminalization of
Domestic Workers in Bahrain,” British Journal of Criminology 49 (2009): pp. 165–
83; Andrew Gardner, “Engulfed: Indian Guest Workers, Bahraini Citizens and the
Structural Violence of the Kafala System,” in Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie
Peutz (eds), The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and Freedom of Movement
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 196–223; Andrew Gardner, City
of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain (Ithaca, NY:
ILR/Cornell University Press, 2010).
2
 See, for example, Silvia Pessoa, Marjorie Carlson, Hanoof Al-Thani, Samiha Kamel,
Hicham Nedjari, Ramsey Ramadan and Karim Watfa, The State of Migrant Workers
in Qatar: The Workers’ Perspective, Final Report, QNRF Undergraduate Research
Experience Program Project, No. 07–12–03, 2008; Silvia Pessoa, Rooda Al-Neama
and Maha Al-Shirrawi, Migrant Workers in Qatar: Documenting their Current Situation, Final Report, QNRF Undergraduate Research Experience Program Project,
No. 05–09–71, 2009.
1
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remains widespread; sponsors typically confiscate migrants’ passports, thereby
significantly impeding their ability to leave problematic employment situations; living conditions are often extremely overcrowded and difficult; sociospatial segregation is the norm; and, for a variety of reasons, migrants have
significant difficulty asserting their basic rights in these foreign states. This
brief list is not comprehensive, but it does include many of the threads that
weave through both the existing scholarly literature and many of the stories
that will be presented later in this chapter.
For nearly a decade, my scholarly work has been focused on labor migration
in the Gulf states, and as an ethnographer, my conclusions have been aligned
with the framework I have just described: in sifting through the lived experiences of the hundreds of men and women who have shared some portion of
their life with me, my analyses perennially focus upon the structural and systemic aspects that undergird the often exploitative relations encountered by
many of these migrants when they enter into a contract for work in the Gulf.3
These conclusions about the extraordinary challenges many labor migrants
face in the Gulf coexist with the fact that a vast flow of remittances streams
from the Gulf to the countries from which these labor migrants come. In
popular sentiment, these two facts are often portrayed in tandem: labor
migrants yield a certain portion of their rights and render themselves vulnerable to exploitation in order to secure the economic opportunities provided
by work in the wealthy Gulf states.
What this explanatory configuration obscures is the fact that the vulnerability and exploitation foreign migrants often encounter in the Gulf are
unequally borne by the poorest members of that transnational population.
While the aggregate Gulf remittance figures are astonishingly large, in my
own ethnographic fieldwork amongst the unskilled population of labor
migrants I have repeatedly encountered men and women for whom a sojourn
in the Gulf states has been a financial catastrophe: by entering into an agreement to travel to the Gulf, these men and women enter into a system that is
fully capable of separating them from the tiny fortunes they and their families
have invested in sending them to the Gulf in the first place. In William Walters’ analysis of illegality and deportation in Europe and North America, he
discerns a “deportation industry,” including not only police and immigration
personnel, but also airline executives, pilots, stewards, and, perhaps more
important, a constellation of private companies that profit from detention
 See Gardner, “Engulfed”, pp. 196-223; Gardner, City of Strangers.

3
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and deportation.4 Borrowing this idea, I suggest we conceptualize the migration system in the Gulf—including the money lenders in South Asian villages, the labor brokers in sending countries, the manpower agencies in the
Gulf states, the citizens who sponsor foreign labor, and managers and supervisors who serve as these sponsors’ proxies—as a migration industry that is not
only geared to aggrandizing profit from the labor of foreign migrants, but
also capable of deriving profit from the migration process itself.
As noted, these conclusions about unskilled and semi-skilled labor migration to the Gulf states serve as a starting point for this chapter; the more
detailed arguments by which I support this position can be found elsewhere.5
In presenting these findings and conclusions at various conferences and meetings over the years, I have encountered one recurring question, paraphrased as
follows: “If things are as bad as you say, then why do migrants keep coming?”6
This chapter endeavors to answer that question. While the fieldwork informing my answer spans a series of projects conducted in Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Qatar, I rely specifically upon the findings of a research project funded by the Center for International and Regional
Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.7
Through this particular project, I was able to follow a diverse group of ten
low-income labor migrants through a year and a half of their lives in Qatar. I
conducted monthly interviews with these men and women, and those interviews collectively provided me with their nuanced perspectives on the challenges and dilemmas they faced in their everyday lives in Qatar, as well as a
perspective on the strategies they devised to overcome many of the challenges
 William Walters, “Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens,”
Citizenship Studies 6 (2002): pp. 265–92.
5
 Gardner, “Engulfed”, pp. 196-223; Gardner, City of Strangers.
6
 Out of respect to the colleague who first presented me with this line of inquiry, I
refer to this as the “Bruce Mann question.”
7
 The basis of this paper is field-based research conducted in Saudi Arabia (1999), the
United Arab Emirates (2002), Bahrain (2002–03) and Qatar (2008-present). These
various research projects were supported by the Saudi Arabian Meteorological and
Environmental Protection Agency, the Foreign Language Area Studies Program, the
Fulbright Program, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, Qatar University, and the Qatar
National Research Fund. While these various projects form a backdrop to the analysis presented here, I rely specifically on the ethnographic data gathered under the
project entitled “A Longitudinal Analysis of Low-Income Laborers in Contemporary
Qatar,” funded by the Center for International and Regional Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.
4
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encountered. The project also allowed me the opportunity to visit these
migrants’ families and communities in Nepal, India and Sri Lanka. Through
those interviews and conversations with migrants and their families, I began
to discern an answer to the aforementioned question, and in the ethnographic
tradition, I use their experiences and their words to illustrate my arguments.
That answer, in three sections, comprises the remainder of this chapter.
From economic poverty to structural violence
Economic concerns obviously play a key role in the impulse to depart one’s
home for the opportunities offered by employment in the Gulf states. While
I will eventually complicate the simplistic logic underpinning this statement,
it is undoubtedly true that salary levels in the Gulf represent the primary
attraction of employment in the region for many migrants. For example,
Ram,8 a forty-year-old migrant from the hilly regions of Nepal, left his village
at the age of fourteen to make his way in the world. He worked in many different jobs in Nepal and India—for years he worked in a Chinese-owned leather
tannery in Kolkata, earning IR 2500 ($54) monthly, but eventually he left
because of the dangerously unhygienic conditions of the factory work. He
later found work as a driver in India, earning IR 7500 ($160) a month minus
expenses, but by then he was married with children, and was unable to make
ends meet. In 2008, his brother-in-law arranged for work as a driver in Qatar,
with the promise of a monthly salary of QR 600 ($165) with expenses paid,
and the possibility of earning even more. In Ram’s particular case, that promise proved to be a mirage—upon arrival in Qatar, he received only QR 500
($137), and, as I will explain later in the chapter, his sponsor withheld several
months’ wages to cover the costs of driving instruction. Despite the problems
he encountered, it is clear that the contractually promised wage levels in the
Gulf states remain competitive in South Asian terms, and often substantially
surpass salary levels in the poorer nations from which many migrants come.
Because this economically grounded justification for migration is so widespread in the migrants’ narratives about the decision to come to the Gulf, it
certainly represents the first answer to the question of why, in the face of such
difficulties, men and women continue to stream to the region.
The ethnographic approach, however, provides a good opportunity to complicate this simple logic, for the interviews I conducted contained stories and
 All the names that appear here are pseudonyms selected by the participants in the
study.

8
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explanations that suggested a wide variety of extra-economic explanations for
labor migration to the Gulf. Like Ram, Roshan was another of the ten
migrants I spent time with between 2008 and 2010. In early 2008, conflicts
between the Tamil Tiger rebels and the state forces reached a crescendo in the
region surrounding his small village in the northern reaches of Sri Lanka.
Despite growing up amidst a veritable civil war, Roshan had been an adept
student, and his family worked hard to stay beyond the social and political
margins of the conflict. In the spring of 2008, however, rumors began to
spread that his sister’s fiancé was an agent for the Tamil Tigers; later these
rumors evolved into a contention that Roshan’s future brother-in-law was a
double agent of the state. On the eve of the young couple’s wedding, masked
motorcycle-borne gunmen shot and killed the young groom outside his prewedding party. The family subsequently spiraled into crisis. Roshan, eighteen
at the time, seemed a likely target as well, although the family was unsure if it
was the government forces or the rebels whom they should fear. Like many
other families in the area, they feared Roshan’s walk to school would be the
last time they would see their son, so his education ceased. Weeks later, he was
detained by the police, beaten, and, by his own account, charged with suspect
dealings. Following the paths of many others enveloped in the Sri Lankan
conflict, the family arranged for the young man to migrate to Qatar. I first met
Roshan a week after his arrival in the Gulf.
Roshan’s family is a poor family, and their financial problems were only
compounded by the violence in the region. The economics of migration certainly played prominently in the context of their decision; after all, there were
jobs in Qatar. But in my ongoing conversations with Roshan and, later, with
his family in northern Sri Lanka, it became increasingly clear that it was the
safety and survival of their son that drove them to mortgage farmland and
pawn the household matriarch’s jewelry to fund his trip abroad. Similar stories
emerged in my discussions with members of the Nepalese contingent of
migrants in Qatar, for many of them had arrived with stories of becoming
embroiled in the Maoist insurgency sweeping through the low Terai plain
found along Nepal’s southern border. Divendra, another labor migrant,
described how corruption in the Nepalese government left the small country
with only an intermittent supply of electricity, and connected this corruption
to his own decision to migrate to the Gulf. Recalling his own failed attempt
to build a computer training institute, he noted that,
The main problem came when we were getting a lot of problems with the electricity.
The electricity would be cut for six or seven hours. My business was totally dependent
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on electricity. If there’s no electricity for six or seven hours, especially in the daytime,
then no one will come. How can I operate the computers? And I don’t have enough
money to buy a generator, because the cheapest generator in Nepal costs one lakh
[$1340]. So I cannot think about that. I was managing to run the institute, but when
the electricity … first it was five to six hours, then it was seven or eight hours—finally
I thought it’s no good. So I had to close the institute. I shut down my business and
came here.

The recurrence of these sorts of stories with many of the migrants in my
small study and, perhaps more tellingly, amongst many of the other men in the
camps I frequently visited, displaces the economics of migration from its central place in the rational calculus driving migration to the Gulf. Certainly the
calculations in the migrants’ heads often involve money, debt, and prevailing
wage levels, but the conditions they face in their home countries are often
connected to socio-political forces that spill outside a strictly economic calculus. The concept of structural violence provides a more theoretically comprehensive angle on the forces driving out-migration—the widespread economic
penury connected to decades of structural adjustment, for example, can be
conceptually conflated with the violence and conflict that inevitably produces
quasi-refugees dependent upon migration and the remittances it produces.9
Roshan’s story yields a second point that merits further discussion. Like
almost all of the South Asian men I have encountered in the Gulf, Roshan
arrived in the Middle East not as a rational and individual economic agent,
but rather as the emissary of a household livelihood strategy. In Roshan’s case,
all the arrangements were made for him by his family, and this was the case for
many of the South Asian men I encountered in Qatar and Bahrain. The
money needed to migrate as an unskilled laborer (typically $1,500 to $3,000)
is generated at the household level from resources controlled by the family’s
patriarch; the decision concerning which member of the family will migrate
9

 See Johan Galtung’s seminal work and the subsequent articulation of the concept by
Paul Farmer and Nancy Scheper-Hughes. In previous work, I have also used Eric
Wolf ’s notion of structural power to expand the definition of structural violence to
encompass the forces that produce highly exploitative relationships between
migrants and citizen-sponsors in the Gulf. See Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and
Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, 6 (1969), pp. 167–91; Paul Farmer, “An
Anthropology of Structural Violence,” Current Anthropology, 45 (2004), pp. 305–
25; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “Dangerous and Endangered Youth: Social Structures
and Determinants of Violence,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Volume
1036 (2004), pp. 13–46; Eric Wolf, Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and
Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Gardner, City of Strangers.
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to the Gulf is decided at the level of the extended family; and the remittances
generated by that individual’s labor while abroad are often under the control
of the migrant’s parents. Vasu, for example, was a young labor migrant from a
rural village in south India. He had worked as a driver in that village. His
uncle, already at work in Qatar, helped arrange for him to come and work as
a tea-boy for a company that serves one of Qatar’s large government ministries. In describing that decision, Vasu explained his family’s rationale:
My parents, my brother, my wife, my daughter and I were living in a very small house
… It’s a government house. The government allots houses to farmers in our area. We
don’t own any property. We don’t have land to call our own. Now, since I’m married,
we need a bigger house. So we took a loan of IR 80,000 [$1,704] plus interest from a
riatu [a wealthy landowner] … I don’t know exactly what the agreement was because
my father arranged the loan.

As his concluding statement suggests, Vasu was entirely unaware of the
economics of his migration. Indeed, his entire working life had been directly
enmeshed in the interests of the extended family. Vasu had originally dropped
out of school to begin to work so that the family might assemble a dowry for
his younger sister. As the family’s finances continued to sputter, they sought a
strategy that might allow them to eventually build a larger house or perhaps
purchase some land. And as with most South Asian migrants, Vasu’s remittances were largely controlled by his father. In the end, his and his family’s
hopes for a better future were dashed in a horrific accident that left his uncle
dead and Vasu severely injured. During his long recovery, the company
stopped paying his salary and the money stopped flowing home. Finally, his
visa was cancelled, and as Vasu scrambled to find a new job that might accommodate his new disability, his family descended into a financial cataclysm.
As this section suggests, part of the answer to the question of why migrants
keep flowing to the region requires that we dissemble some of the premises
that underlie that question. One of those premises is that the migrant fits the
mold of homo economicus—in other words, that she or he is an individual,
rational economic agent. As these men’s stories suggest, the unit at work in the
decision process to migrate to the Gulf is typically not the individual but the
family (and, in the case of South Asia, the extended family). While that family
may or may not have perfect information about the wages and conditions
migrants potentially face in the Gulf states (issues I will deal with more
directly in the remainder of this chapter), it is often not the migrant himself
who is making the decision about the migrant’s sojourn. This social fact complicates the logic of Gulf migration: in many cases, migrants keep coming
because their families insist upon it. I have also contended that the economic
48
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rationale for migration, while certainly important, is often not the only factor
involved in the decision to migrate. Utilizing the concept of structural violence, we can begin to connect the low wage levels and lack of opportunity
many of these potential migrants face in their homeland with a much wider
array of social and political forces that are intricately intertwined with the
decision to migrate to the Gulf.
Contractual deception and the search for ignorance
When one looks for patterns and recurring events in the lives of the unskilled
and semi-skilled laborers who arrive in the Gulf states, deception—particularly contractual deception—seems to occupy the center stage in their narratives. Many of the men in this study (and many of the men I have encountered
over the years in the Gulf ) arrive to a job that is substantially different from
the position described to them in their home country. Most commonly this
deception involves salary levels, working hours, and type of employment.
While this deception is widespread, locating a particular juncture at which
responsibility for it can be pinned is an impossible task: as the narratives I will
present describe, this disinformation can come from a variety of parties who
comprise the migration system connecting Qatar and the other Gulf states to
the sending countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Ram, the Nepalese driver whom I introduced in the previous section, built
upon his years of experience as a driver in India when he departed for Qatar.
Through a friend already in Doha, Ram was able to arrange for a visa enabling
him to work as driver for a Qatari family. Arriving in Qatar, he was given QR
100 ($27.50) for food and expenditures, and taken to a room in a labor camp
within a mile of his sponsor’s home. Very little happened in the first few
months, and Ram struggled to understand his circumstances. He received no
salary, but in the second month his sponsor gave him another QR 100 for
food and other expenditures. The Qatari sponsor promised that he would
receive his salary once he passed the driving exam, but the chain of events
leading to that endpoint was formidable: Ram had to pass the medical exam,
obtain an official ID, enroll in a 40-day driving course, and pass the driving
exam, in that specific order. At the conclusion of his second month in Qatar,
only the medical test was complete, and Ram finally confronted his sponsor.
Shortly after that confrontation, he described his situation to me:
I am very much worried because I have not received any of the salary promised to me,
and my sponsor has delayed my entry into the driving school. I complained to him
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that I have received no salary and haven’t been enrolled in the driving school, and so
within a few days he produced my official ID. At least now I can enroll in the driving
class. But I still won’t receive any salary for several months. What can I do? How can
I send my family the money they need?

The weeks following our conversation were equally difficult. Other
migrants reported that he needed to pay the driving instructor extra money in
order to pass the exam, but Ram had no extra money to give. He finally found
another migrant willing to loan him QR 2,000 ($550), but opted to send this
home to his desperate family rather than use it for the driving instructor. He
felt lucky when he received notice that he had passed the driving exam. His
sponsor, however, informed him that his pay would be QR 500 ($137), not
QR 600 ($165). By his own estimation, Ram had been working twenty hours
a day on average, and for much of that time he endured various gardening and
cleaning duties on top of his work as a driver. He confronted his sponsor
several times in the following months, and while he was eventually able to
obtain the QR 600 salary originally promised to him, he received no pay for
the first three months of his time in Qatar. As his sponsor contended, over QR
3,000 ($824) had been spent for the driving course, identification, medical
test, and other costs—the sponsor was carrying this debt for Ram.
Such scenarios were common in the small pool of participants I followed
in Qatar. Ramesh, an enterprising young migrant from the Nepalese Terai, was
promised a job as a supervisor, but arrived to find he would work as a tea-boy
at a significantly lower pay level. Rao, an Indian migrant from Andhra
Pradesh, had both trained and worked at a welder in India, and departed for
Qatar under the impression that he would be welding there as well. Upon
arrival, however, he was demoted to welder-helper and its lower salary level.
Divendra, Binod and Sanjay—three other participants in the project—arrived
to jobs that roughly resembled those described to them in their homes (Nepal,
Nepal, and India, respectively), but simply went unpaid for much of their time
in Doha. Their companies were three or four months behind the promised
salary schedule. The last of these three migrants, Sanjay, simply gave up on his
company and returned to Kerala after his third month in Qatar. As all of this
suggests, labor migrants frequently encounter misinformation and deception
in their journey to the Gulf.
No single conduit shuttles labor to the Gulf. As the above stories suggest,
some migrants arrange their sojourn in the Gulf with the help of relatives or
friends with some connection to sponsors in the GCC states. Others work
through a system of labor brokers that connects most regions of South Asia,
50
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Africa, and Southeast Asia to the opportunities of the Gulf states.10 This brokerage system may include subagents who move from village to village in
search of potential migrants (and therefore profit). These agencies may or may
not be registered with the state. Legitimate brokers, whether registered or not,
may or may not have good information about the jobs they purvey. For example, in discussing the working conditions the men he had sent to the Gulf face,
one labor broker in south India clearly articulated how little he knew about
the working conditions in the Gulf:
I don’t know much about the working conditions in Doha. It depends on the company
and the type of work and also the post of each worker. For example, a supervisor
doesn’t work under the sun the whole time. On the other hand, a welder works under
the sun for about 8 hours a day. Not more than that. I don’t think they work for 10 or
12 hours a day. All I know is that the companies who contact us are reputed and legitimate. And Qatar is a desert so the workers know what to expect. During the training
session we make them work under the sun for a few hours …

While labor brokerage firms and other formalized conduits play an important role in migration to the Gulf states, chain migration remains a vital conduit for tens of thousands of migrants to the Arabian Peninsula. As a result,
migrants often find themselves complicit in the contractual deception that
commonly occurs. By the end of his first year in Qatar, for example, Divendra’s
employer, a small construction company, faced a desperate labor shortage.
Attrition (largely driven by the non-payment of promised wages) had left the
company with too few drivers for the various trucks that served as the basis for
the small business. Despite the fact that his company owed him and the other
employees over three months of back wages, Divendra, who through hard
work and extraordinary diplomacy had gained the trust of his Egyptian manager, was asked to utilize his networks in Nepal to bring a cohort of new truck
drivers and laborers to Qatar. This put Divendra in a quandary. Could he live
with the burden of bringing new migrants into such a problematic situation?
The men would certainly blame him if things went awry, and from his experiences in the company, that was almost assured. At the same time, his own
contract was approaching its conclusion, and if he did not keep his manager
happy, it was entirely possible that the manager would significantly delay his
10

 See Gamburd, The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle; Rachel Silvey, “Transnational Domestication: State Power and Indonesian Migrant Women in Saudi Arabia,” Political
Geography, 23 (2004), pp. 245–64; Prema Kurien, Kaleidoscopic Ethnicity: International Migration and the Reconstruction of Community Identities in India (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), pp. 62–4.
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departure. Divendra stalled for several months, but then the manager’s tone
became more urgent. Describing the situation, Divendra noted that,
Whenever the managers ask me to find replacements, I make up excuses and tell them
that most of the Nepali men I know are going to Dubai soon … My general manager
told me to put an ad in the newspaper in Nepal for heavy duty drivers, and he told me
that I would be responsible for everything. It would be my responsibility to shortlist
the candidates so that he could issue visas for them. I’m very confused right now. I
don’t know what to do. There are only five months left on my contract. I think I have
to play a game so that I can listen to the general manager and at the same time save the
people in Nepal from entering his trap.
“[Andrew] How will you do that?”
I have a friend in Kathmandu. I will tell him to send an official email as XYZ manpower agency. I will send an official email to the make believe agency, and say that the
company needs a few workers and I will tell my friend to reply. I will tell him to say
that it would take about four months to recruit these men in Nepal so that I can buy
some time with the general manager. After four months, it will be time for me to
return and I will tell the manager that I would send him the CVs as soon as I go back
to Nepal. Then when I finally go back, I will disappear. That’s my plan.

As Divendra delayed, the general manager found a way to sweeten the offer.
The manager suggested that Divendra and his Nepalese co-worker, Sam,
would be welcome to extract (and keep) a QR 1,500 ($413) or perhaps even
QR 2,000 ($550) fee from each of the thirty successful applicants. For Divendra and Sam—young men earning a salary of $330 a month, most of which
was directed to the moneylenders who financed their journey in the first
place—this was an extraordinary amount of money. Divendra and Sam had
already expressed an ethical concern with the proposal, for any men they
brought to the company would face the same verbal abuse, non-payment of
wages, and exploitation that had led to the current attrition in the first place.
As we explored these issues further, however, Sam put a more practical frame
on their decision to avoid facilitating more Nepalese migration:
[Sam] I said okay, I will try my best to find some new drivers in Nepal with the licenses
for driving heavy trucks. But in truth I will not do this for the company, because these
people, they are very bad and the company now has a very bad reputation. If I bring
these people here, then certainly these people will face many problems. So I don’t want
to bring anyone here …
[Andrew] So let’s see … that would be [calculating] … QR 37,500 or so. That’s
$10,000! That’s big money!
[Sam] Yes, I could earn that much money from these twenty-five or thirty visas. But
the main problem is when these people face the real problems here in Doha with a
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company like this, they will tell all the truth about those problems to their family
members and their parents in Nepal. And now the situation in Nepal is very bad.
Again the Maoists are going to strike, and if by mistake anyone speaks of this to the
Maoists, they will kill me. So why would I knowingly bring this trouble to myself ?
[Divendra] $10,000 he would be getting, but he would be facing a $50,000 problem
at home.

In the next section of this chapter, I explore the role that migrants themselves play in the representation of the Gulf and their experiences there. In this
section, I have used the experiences and perspectives of several participants in
this project to portray the complexities of this migration system and the multiple junctions at which deception is purveyed. In answering the question as
to why migrants keep coming to the Gulf, I contend that we must also look to
the complexities of a system that produces misinformation and disinformation across the transnational divide. As I have suggested, labor brokers provide
one of the most visible links in this chain, but they are often working with
poor information about the working conditions in the Gulf, and as Divendra’s
and Sam’s experiences make clear, migrants themselves are often called upon
to participate in this process and, for profit, represent employment in the Gulf
in ways that differ significantly from the reality on the ground.
Labor migrants and the image of the Gulf
In late 2002, I was conducting fieldwork in Bahrain and, for bureaucratic
reasons, I required another dozen passport photographs for the various forms
and badges associated with my host institution. I made my way to a small
photography studio at the end of the street, and after a brief discussion with
the photographer/clerk I was ushered into the studio itself, located in the back
room of the building. In that room were all the various accessories one would
expect to find in a photography studio, along with an office desk located
prominently on the stage side of the room. Next to the desk was a clothes pole
with various sports jackets, button-up shirts, and clip-on ties. On the wall I
could see examples of photographs that made use of this stage, set and props.
I asked the proprietor about these photographs, and he described the reality
of the situation in very straightforward terms: men who work menial and
socially demeaning jobs burnish their image by sending home photographs of
themselves sitting behind this desk in suit and tie. Across the transnational
divide, custodians become office workers, tea boys become accountants, and
clerks become managers.
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Over time and years of fieldwork, this episode from 2002 evolved from an
odd juncture in my fieldnotes to the central example of an interconnected web
of observations that collectively point to the widespread and systemic generation of disinformation about working and living conditions in the Gulf. Without a doubt, migrants themselves are actively engaged in the production of
this disinformation. These are pre-eminently understandable actions—men
and women seek to protect their reputations, to assuage their worried families,
and to shape their social identities in the publics to which they will eventually
return. As Filippo and Caroline Osella have described, migration to the Gulf
also produces subjectivities aligned to a set of pre-established identities (like
the “Gulfie”) constructed in an earlier era when the association between Gulf
migration and wealth was more assured.11 Collectively, however, these actions
contribute directly to the misrepresentation of conditions in the Gulf, and are
therefore another integral component in the answer to the question at hand.
In the current decade, images have come to play a central role in the processes I seek to chart. The proliferation of camera phones and digital cameras
means that even at the lowest echelons of the transmigrant workforce, images
play an integral role in transnational communication and identity construction. The men and women I tracked in Qatar all had access to camera phones
and/or cameras, and the production of images was one of the primary activities during their days off. Middle class denizens of Qatar and the other Gulf
states are familiar with the sight of workers photographing one another in the
green landscaped sites in front of shopping malls, in traffic circles, or along the
Corniche. Perhaps what is less clear is that these sites are carefully selected by
the migrants, and contrast sharply with the sites these men and women omit
from their photographs. As Divendra described:
If we visited our camp today, and if I just stood in front of the apartment where you
park your car, and we just took a photograph and sent it to my family, how would they
feel? They would feel worried. They would think, if their accommodation is like this,
what must their food and room be like? They often ask for photographs of where we
stay, of the food, of the rooms, of the kitchen. They want to see it. They want to know
what it’s like where we stay. We just tell them that we don’t have a camera, or that it’s
broken. I just keep telling them I will take photographs and I will send them to you
later. These are the things that we do … so when we send these photographs of us in
these friendly and beautiful places [like shopping malls and parks], they will be happy
for us.
Caroline Osella and Filippo Osella, “Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala,”
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 6 (2000), pp. 117–33.
11
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As Divendra notes, his portrayal of his life in Qatar to family and friends is
heavily edited. He carefully avoids including any images that might raise the
concerns of his family, and present a carefully managed image of his time
abroad.
Beginning in 2008 and 2009, many of the men in the labor camps I visited
were seeking to purchase low-end netbook computers with any savings they
could accrue during their work abroad. These netbooks are the latest entries
into the lexicon of symbolically laden goods associated with successful migration to the Gulf (earlier it was Ray-ban sunglasses, gold chains, mobile phones,
and digital cameras). In addition to their symbolic function, the presence of
these netbooks in the labor camps gives many of the men access to Facebook
and other social networking sites where more comprehensive portrayals of life
in the Gulf can be articulated and tended. Like the images they send home,
the portrayals amassed on Facebook and similar sites portray a green, leisurely,
and high-consumerist life in place of the harsh realities many migrants face in
their day to day lives in the Gulf.
While many of the men and women who migrate to Qatar and the other
Gulf states depart their homeland with an image of the Gulf as a bountiful
land of opportunity, they face significant challenges once in place in those
states. Across the board, one of the most common difficulties they face is
underpayment and non-payment of wages. With families and friends receiving only the sanitized version of the Gulf experience produced by the images
and stories that travel back home, many migrants who face underpayment or
non-payment of wages often begin to borrow money to keep up appearances.
Ram, the driver I introduced early in this chapter, went four months without
salary—he was receiving driving instruction, and his sponsor deducted the
costs of the course from his salary—while Ram’s family continued to plead for
money. As noted earlier in the chapter, Ram finally borrowed QR 2,000
($550) from friends and remitted the money to his wife in Nepal. Similarly,
Binod, a heavy truck driver from Nepal, was engaged in a protracted legal
battle with his sponsor for much of 2009 and 2010. In the midst of that legal
battle, the company stopped paying Binod, and Binod stopped working. He
spent his days alone at the camp, and while he was very careful with his spending, his debts nonetheless slowly mounted. By the time his case was settled in
June of 2010, he owed various friends thousands of Qatari riyals. Much of that
money had been borrowed to send home to his family, and was part of his
attempt to present a story of seamless and successful earning while abroad.
The carefully managed images of life in the Gulf became a particularly acute
concern in planning my trips to visit with the families of the migrants I
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tracked in Qatar. While all of the labor migrants were happy that I would visit
their families and communities in South Asia, further discussions and pretravel planning revealed concerns about potential damage I might cause to the
images of life and work they had so carefully constructed from afar. In the
interviews preceding my visits to Nepal, Sri Lanka, and India, I worked carefully with these migrants to grasp the limitations they wished to impose on
my interactions with their families and, more specifically, on my descriptions
of their life in Qatar. Many of these restrictions focused on the conditions in
the labor camp: many of the camps lack running water and secure electricity
connections, and many migrants live in extremely crowded and unhygienic
conditions. The migrants sought (and received) my complicity in hiding these
often difficult living conditions from family and friends in their home
communities.
As I have already noted, these are certainly understandable actions: as the
migrants themselves describe, they are mostly interested in protecting the
emotional state of their loved ones back home, and the edited versions of life
in Qatar and the other Gulf states are intended to insulate their family and
friends from concern over the harsh realities many migrants face in the Arabian Peninsula. In aggregate, however, tens of thousands of migrants engaged
in the production of a sanitized image of life in the Gulf fuel out-migration
from these sending countries, for that image omits many of the exploitative
and challenging aspects of the typical migration experience. To answer the
question as to why migrants keep flowing to the region in spite of the oftenchallenging conditions they potentially face, we must accommodate the fact
that migrants themselves, along with the labor brokers described in the previous section, construct an image of life in the Gulf that disguises or omits many
of the significant challenges transnational labor migrants typically face.12
12

 In her examination of the Mexican/American flow of migrants, Balli provides an
answer to this question as well. As one migrant described, “We get too carried away
with the success stories we hear about in the United States … We go there and pursue wayward lives. We cheat on our wives and ignore our children. And then we rent
expensive cars and jewelry when we visit so that our families in Mexico will think
that we have made it. We entice others to come back across the border with us,
telling them lies about how good and easy it is. We tell them they can stay in our
homes, but once they’re around we get tired of them eating our food.” Cecilia Balli,
“The Border is Wide: Guarding the Southern Flank of the American Dream,”
Harper’s Magazine, 313 (2006), p. 67. Similarly, George Packer quotes Folarin
Gbadebo-Smith, the chairman of a district of Lagos Island, who also describes the
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Conclusion
To recapitulate, in answering the question as to why unskilled and low-skill
migrants continue to stream to the Gulf states in spite of the difficult conditions and exploitative labor relations many of them encounter in the region, I
have argued that a variety of factors are at work in the calculus of Gulf migration. First, there is no doubt that the salary levels in the Gulf states remain
competitive in the global context, and that the economic calculations these
salary levels drive are a primary motivation for the continuing strength of
these migration flows. Behind that simple fact, however, is the much more
complicated mechanics of Gulf migration. I have argued that a variety of
extra-economic concerns often play a central role in the decision to migrate,
and that the decision to migrate often does not belong to the individual
migrant, but rather to the familial unit. These factors complicate simplistic
portrayals of the migration decision, and as I have argued here, these factors
also foster the proliferation of poor information in the migration process.
In my close examination of the lives of a small set of labor migrants in
Qatar, I have also begun to delineate the multiple junctures at which misinformation and disinformation are purveyed within this transnational migration system. Subagents and labor brokers in the sending countries often have
poor information about the contracts they arrange, and profit incentives often
become aligned with the purveying of disinformation about the challenges
and difficulties men and women often face in the Gulf. Manpower agencies,
citizen-sponsors and their proxies in the receiving states similarly benefit from
the ongoing flow of migrants with incomplete or incorrect information about
labor conditions in the Gulf states. With the scale of this migration flow in
mind and the profit that is drawn from the migration process itself, I have
contended that we can envision this system as a “migration industry” that uses

distorted picture that flows back to the village: “Come Christmas, everybody in
Lagos—the successful and the unsuccessful—packs their bags and goes off to the
rural areas to show off what they have achieved,” Gbadebo-Smith said. “Some
achievements are real, for some it’s just a mirage, but everybody’s there showing off.
So the young people in the villages very quickly come to the conclusion that ‘Hey,
I’ve got to go to Lagos, make enough to be able to come back here, and to show off ’.”
In this way, the West African countryside is being rapidly depopulated. Cecilia Balli,
“The Border is Wide: Guarding the Southern Flank of the American Dream,”
Harper’s Magazine, 313 (2006), pp. 63–70; George Packer, “The Megacity: Decoding the Chaos of Lagos,” The New Yorker (November 13, 2006).
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poor information and disinformation to extract profit from the flow of
unskilled migrants to the region.
Finally, I have contended that migrants themselves undoubtedly play a role
in burnishing the image of the Gulf sojourn. By carefully grooming the portrayal of their time in the Gulf, individual migrants collectively contribute to
the production of an image of the Gulf that often omits the primary challenges and difficulties that unskilled laborers experience in the region. These
omissions are often tied to their desire to maintain their social status or placate
worried families; however, through chain migration, the migrants’ transmission of disinformation can also become tied to the profitable junctures of this
migration industry.
Altogether, these multiple and overlapping factors complicate and problematize some of the fundamental premises underlying the question driving
this chapter. The long tradition of homo economicus portrays humans—and
migrants—as self-interested agents who make rational choices from the constellation of options presented to them. While the arguments presented in this
chapter pose no challenge to the rationality of the Gulf migrant, that rationality faces a blizzard of misinformation and disinformation that renders that
rationality almost meaningless. Nor is the migrant best conceived as a rational
individual actor: more typically, I have noted, the migrant is the emissary of a
familial livelihood strategy, and the purportedly rational decision to migrate
is diffused within the extended family. As this suggests, analyses of this migration industry need to more directly apprehend the connection between
imperfect information and profit.
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